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Abstract. Security-critical system requirements are increasingly enforced
through mandatory access control systems. These systems are controlled
by security policies, highly sensitive system components, which empha-
sizes the paramount importance of formally verified security properties
regarding policy correctness. For the class of safety-properties, address-
ing potential dynamic right proliferation, a number of known and tested
formal analysis methods and tools already exist. Unfortunately, these
methods need to be redesigned from scratch for each particular policy
from a broad range of different application domains. In this paper, we
seek to mitigate this problem by proposing a uniform formal framework,
tailorable to a safety analysis algorithm for a specific application domain.
We present a practical workflow, guided by model-based knowledge, that
is capable of producing a meaningful formal safety definition along with
an algorithm to heuristically analyze that safety. Our method is demon-
strated based on security policies for the SELinux operating system.
Keywords: Security engineering, security policies, access control sys-
tems, access control models, safety, heuristic analysis, SELinux.
1 Introduction
In a wide range of modern applications, software systems engineers are chal-
lenged by tightening security requirements based on legal and economical re-
quirements. This challenge has been met by the approach of policy-controlled
systems, whose design and implementation relies on formally specified security
policies [35]. These policies define rules that, reliably enforced by a system’s im-
plementation, can be proven to meet formalized security requirements. One of
the most important families of security policies is described by access control
(AC) models, which can be used to model and verify most security policies of
today’s policy-controlled systems [8, 10, 15, 21, 25, 30, 31, 34].
Because of the paramount importance of formal models, a plethora of meth-
ods has emerged for their specification, analysis and implementation. More specif-
ically, models for access control policies can be subdivided based on two principal
objectives: either, to precisely specify the semantics of a particular policy family,
e. g. roles [27] or user relationships [9, 14], or to focus on a precise definition of
a particular security property, which represents a formalized security require-
ment (such as confinement of access right proliferation [12, 16] or information
flows [19]). However, models resulting from both objectives have turned out in-
compatible due to different formalisms; moreover, any new model focused on
either objective has always required a new formal calculus from scratch.
These problems have been addressed by the paradigm of model-based se-
curity engineering [4, 5, 19, 20, 22]. Its goal is a uniform pattern for designing
and analyzing security models, which should encompass the full bandwidth of
practically important analysis goals, including dynamic, time-variant security
properties in the lineage of HRU safety [16]. Aiming at these requirements, a
recent, promising formal framework is the core-based modeling pattern [20, 22].
To streamline model-based systems security engineering based on this pat-
tern, we have introduced the entity labeling approach as a complementary pat-
tern [2]. We have shown how access control policies of the SELinux operating
system, as a typical representative of policy-controlled systems, can be modeled
using standardized, uniform semantic abstraction based on the principle of at-
tribution. The resulting SELinux access control model SELX was discussed with
a focus on specification costs, nevertheless neglecting an in-depth review of the
actual policy analysis merits and costs.
In this work, we argue that both the core-based and the entity labeling
pattern pave the way towards a uniform model analysis framework. This claim is
substantiated by demonstrating how to tailor a general, heuristic-based analysis
method for dynamic system properties (commonly known as safety properties)
to the SELX model by leveraging the additional semantic information. In the
process, we will define fundamental abstract interfaces to safety analysis methods
that can be easily reused to tailor the same approach to other policy domains.
Contributions of this work include
1. a generalization of the DepSearch heuristic for model safety analysis [3],
with the goal to be adaptable to every core-based/EL access control model,
2. a partially automatable workflow of tailoring both a formal safety property
and an appropriate heuristic to a specific model,
3. a demonstration of this process for SELX, resulting in a specialized safety
analysis algorithm for SELinux security policies.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: After a brief discussion of
relevant related work (Sec. 2), both the core-based and the entity labeling pattern
for model-based security engineering are described (Sec. 3). This provides a
basis for reviewing a promising heuristic approach to dynamic model analysis,
DepSearch, in Sec. 4, which is then rewritten in a generalized form (Sec. 5.1).
Sec. 5.2 describes the novel workflow of tailoring this general heuristic to an
actual access control model, which is finally applied to the practical example of
SELinux in Sec. 6. We conclude with Section 7.
2 Related Work
This work is based on our previous work towards flexible modeling patterns [2,4].
A significant body of research has covered similar goals of unifying security
models to reduce the costs of systems security engineering in practice. Notable
work in this area includes meta models for abstract access control policies [5,
6], information flow policies [19], attribute-based access control policies [18],
and diverse hybrid paradigms [11, 17]. All these approaches share the goal of
unifying and thus streamlining policy specification and implementation; formal
analysis of policies on the other hand is not regarded a focal goal in any of
them. Consequently, a generalization of automaton-based model descriptions
(core-based modeling) was introduced to model vital system properties, such as
PEP interfaces and protection state dynamics, in a uniform yet flexible calculus
[20, 22]. Our approach to generalizing heuristics for safety analysis is based on
this latter pattern.
Due to their paramount importance in practical attack scenario, security
properties based on system dynamics have always received significant attention
in terms of a broad body of formal analysis methods. Ultimately, however, the
fundamental property of safety (introduced by Harrison, Ruzzo and Ullman [16])
is proven to be undecidable – which led to massive efforts in reducing a model’s
complexity and thus expressive power in a least-obstructive way, assuming a
specific, well-defined application domain. In virtue of such expressive restric-
tions, dynamic model analysis approaches such as [13,24,26,28,29,32] share the
goal of precisely deciding their particular descendant of safety. Based on the
goal of maximum flexibility, which naturally prohibits any restrictive assump-
tions about policy semantics, our approach takes the opposite path: instead of
sacrificing parts of a model’s expressive power, heuristic safety analysis sacri-
fices decidability. This enables tractability of the original, merely semi-decidable
safety property and naturally yields an approximate solution.1 Our most promis-
ing approach to heuristic analysis, DepSearch [3], is therefore generalized in
this paper to fit any core-based entity labeling model. The notion of safety used
in our approach is based on Tripunitara’s and Li’s [33] precise and meaningful
revisions of the original safety-definition.
Our approach tries to merge the merits of two general information modeling
paradigms: attributes (ABAC in the security context) and ontologies. The latter
is leveraged in our approach to introduce semantic knowledge into the security
policy engineering as early as possible, just before formalization starts, based
only on a security requirements analysis. The goal is to reduce the potential of
human error in the later phases of formal analysis and specification of a security
policy, which should be automated based on rules that can be derived from the
richer semantical knowledge about the model.
3 Model Engineering
This section introduces the two basic formal approaches we will use to model and
analyze AC systems: the core-based modeling pattern by Po¨lck [20,22], and the
entity labeling (EL) pattern [1,2]. A security modeling pattern can be regarded
1 An actually satisfied safety-requirement is not confirmable; however the critical case
of unsatisfied safety, once confirmed, can be traced back to its cause.
a specialized type of ontology, defined along with a particular formal calculus.
Each modeling pattern reflects a slightly different view on an AC system, tailored
to different policy specification and/or policy analysis goals.
Throughout the rest of this paper, we will use the following conventions
for formal notation: |= is a binary relation between variable assignments and
formulas in second-order logic, where I |= φ iff I is an assignment of unbound
variables to values that satisfies φ. In an unambiguous context, we will write
〈x0, . . . , xn〉 |= φ for any assignment of variables xi in φ that satisfies φ. A logical
formula assigned to a variable is delimited by [[ ]]. We will mark fixed values
referenced from outside the formula by underlining, e.g. a fixed x in an expression
φ = [[ y = x ]]. For any mapping f , f [x 7→ y] denotes the mapping which maps
x to y and any other argument x′ to f(x′). For any mapping f : A → B, f ↾A′
denotes a restriction of f to A′ ⊂ A that maps any argument x′ ∈ A′ to f(x′),
whereas f ↾A′ (x) is undefined for any x ∈ A \A′. For any set A, 2A denotes the
power set of A. B is the set of Boolean values ⊤ (true) and ⊥ (false).
3.1 Core-based Modeling
The goal of the core-based model engineering paradigm is to establish a uniform
formal basis for specification, analysis and implementation of diverse security
models. A core-based access control model is defined as an extended state ma-
chine, called model core:
〈Q,Σ, δ, λ, q0,Ext〉
where Q is a (finite or infinite) set of protection states, Σ is a (finite or infinite)
set of inputs, δ : Q × Σ → Q is the state transition function, λ : Q × Σ → B
is the output function, q0 ∈ Q is the initial protection state, and Ext is an
arbitrary tuple of static model extensions. The model core can be tailored to
any domain-specific security policy in terms of dynamic state members and static
model extensions. We formally do this by introducing two sets DYN of model
components that may change their state, and STAT of such which may not. In
practice, these sets are determined by the semantics of security policy rules: For
a classical AC policy equivalent to an HRU model for example, we will define
DYN = {S,O, acm} and STAT = {R} for the model components subjects set
S, objects set O, access control matrix acm : S × O→ 2R, and rights set R.
Based on the abstract automaton and the definition of model components,
three steps are required to describe a particular AC system through a core-based
model (cf. [22, pp. 25 et seq.]): (1.) Specializing Q, i.e. explicitly defining the
automaton’s state space members (based on DYN ). (2.) Specializing Ext, i.e.
defining static model components (based on STAT). (3.) Specializing δ and λ,
i.e. describing the dynamic behavior of the AC system. Depending on step 1, the
initial protection state q0 has to be specified according to the particular analysis
goal. Depending on both steps 1 and 2, the input alphabet Σ has to be specified
according to the interface of the modeled access control system.
In step 3, protection state dynamics are described by the state transition
function δ through pre- and post-conditions of every possible state transition.
This is done by comparing each input with two formulas in second-order logic,
PRE and POST. We then define δ by formally specifying the conditions that each
pair of states q and q′ has to satisfy w.r.t. an input σ ∈ Σ for a state transition
from q to q′ to occur:
δ(q, σ) =
{
q′, 〈q, σ〉 |= PRE ∧ 〈q′, σ〉 |= POST
q, otherwise.
Because an access control system is fundamentally deterministic, POST requires
that q′ equals q where not redefined. In practice, PRE and POST are divided
into commands that match particular interface calls of the modeled system: For
any command cmd ∈ ΣC , PRE(cmd) denotes the partial, command-specific pre-
condition of cmd and POST(cmd) its post-condition. The AC system’s interface
is then modeled by Σ = ΣC×ΣX , where ΣC is a set of command identifiers and
ΣX contains sequences of possible values (command parameters) for variables in
PRE and POST. This engineering-friendly notation dates back to the first access
control models [7,16] and allows for a structured, system-specific notation of δ in
terms of partial definitions depending on each input command. We will call the
set of such partial definitions ∆ = {〈cmd , xcmd ,PRE(cmd),POST(cmd)〉 |cmd ∈
ΣC ;xcmd ∈ ΣX ;PRE(cmd),POST(cmd) ∈ B} a model’s state transition scheme,
a specification of the behavior of δ. The notation of a simple example command
delegateRead of an HRU model’s state transition scheme is shown in Fig. 1.
Finally, to describe authorization decisions of an AC system, the automaton
features an output function λ. It enables the analysis of correct policy behavior
and thus supports a formally verified specification. λ defines a binary access
decision λ(q, σ) ⇔ 〈q, σ〉 |= PRE.
◮ delegateRead(s1, s2, o) ::=
PRE: read right ∈ acmq(s1, o) ;
POST: acmq′ = acmq[〈s2, o〉 7→ acmq(s2, o) ∪ {read right}]
Fig. 1. Exemplary command definition for a core-based HRU model. We specify a
command delegateRead with parameters 〈s1, s2, o〉 that models delegation of read right
regarding o by s1 to s2. PRE(delegateRead ) expresses that s1 needs to possess this right
for a state transition by this command to occur, POST(delegateRead ) expresses that
s2 needs to do so afterwards.
3.2 Entity Labeling
Entity Labeling (EL) is an abstract semantic modeling pattern for the formal-
ization of contemporary access control policies. It was originally introduced with
a focus on operating systems security policies [1,2] and is based on three obser-
vations regarding the semantics of such policies:
1. attributes that label entities are used for making access decisions
2. the protection state described is dynamic, i. e. the actual system’s configu-
ration that policy rules refer to may change over time
3. time-invariant constraints restrict possible changes of the protection state;
in practice, such constraints may be system-intrinsic (e. g. policy consistency
criteria) as well as external (responding so a system’s environmental context)
These observations lead to six semantic categories that describe an access
control system from a quite different angle than core-based modeling does: as
an ontology describing attribution-based policy logic. In practice, core-model
components in DYN and STAT also fall into one of these EL categories:
Label Set (LS): Set of legal label values.
Relabeling Rule (RR): Rules for legal label changes.
Entity Set (ES): Sets of entity identifiers.
Label Assignment (LA): Associations between a entity and its labels.
Access Rule (AR): Rules that describe, given two or more labels, operations
that accordingly labeled entities are allowed to perform. AR components
typically constitute an AC model’s access control function (ACF).
Model Constraints (MC): Constraints over the other components that must
be satisfied in every model state.
For specializing these categories, their semantics have to be matched to policy
logic – a task that should be performed based on a system’s security require-
ments, ideally during requirements analysis and system design. This highlights
the importance of a rigorous requirements engineering, which lays the foundation
of later model-based security analysis. At the same time, EL modeling helps to
introduce and preserve such critical knowledge about an AC system’s intended
semantics early in the whole engineering process.
On a formal level, the EL pattern is described by a tuple 〈CAT , sem〉 where
CAT = {LS ,RR,ES ,LA,AR,MC} is the set of EL category identifiers and
sem : CAT → 2DYN∪STAT is their semantics association to model components
as described above. For the sake of brevity, EL semantics of a model M are
denoted by M|cat = sem(cat) where cat ∈ CAT is a semantic category identifier.
Note that the EL pattern complements core-based modeling by adding ab-
stracted knowledge about a system’s requirements to the automaton-based cal-
culus. Using both in combination, we can reason about meaningful analysis goals,
their formal definition, and the interpretation of analysis results (e. g. the seman-
tic origins of a right proliferation in a policy’s logic) as part of a generalizable
security engineering approach. We argue for this claim by presenting a general-
ized analysis approach for dynamic model properties in the following sections.
4 Model Analysis
In this section, we discuss the basic idea of heuristic safety analysis. We will out-
line one of the most successful algorithmic approaches to this problem,DepSearch,
presented for the HRU access control model in [3,4]. On this basis, we will later
introduce a systematic generalization of DepSearch.
4.1 Heuristic Safety Analysis
The most general research questions targeted by the analysis of an access control
system relate to the proliferation of access rights. As formalized in the seminal
HRU access control model [16], the safety of a system fundamentally addresses
such questions: Given a protection state of an HRU model, is it possible that
some subject ever obtains a specific right with respect to some object? If this may
happen, such a model state is considered unsafe with respect to that right. An
intuitive yet practically meaningful interpretation of this question, (r)-simple-
safety, has been defined (via its complement) by Tripunitara and Li [33]:
Definition 1. Given a core-based HRU model 〈Q,Σ, δ, λ, q0, 〈R〉〉, a state q =
〈Sq, Oq, acmq〉 ∈ Q is (r)-simple-unsafe with respect to a right r ∈ R iff ∃ q′ =
〈Sq′ , Oq′ , acmq′ 〉 ∈ {δ∗(q, a) | a ∈ Σ∗}:
∃s ∈ Sq′ , ∃o ∈ Oq′ : r ∈ acmq′(s, o)
∧
(
s /∈ Sq ∨ o /∈ Oq ∨ r /∈ acmq(s, o)
)
.
where δ∗ : Q × Σ∗ → Q is the transitive state transition function defined as
δ∗(q, σ ◦ b) = δ∗(δ(q, σ), b) and δ∗(q, ǫ) = q for any σ ∈ Σ ∪ {ǫ}, b ∈ Σ∗.
Two facts are worth noting here: First, safety as per Def. 1 always relates
to both a specific model state q to analyze (in practice, this is a momentary
configuration of the system in question) and a specific access right r whose
proliferation we are interested in. We call this r, being the source of an HRU
model’s authentication mechanics, a safety analysis target. Second, Def. 1 is least
restrictive with respect to r since it allows any subject or object to violate safety.
In practice, possible analysis questions may rather concentrate on a specific s or
o, leading to more specialized safety definitions such as (s,o,r)-simple-safety [33].
It is long since known that any variant of safety is not decidable, given
an access control models with unrestricted expressive power and thus infinite
state space [16]. In order to analyze such models, we must trade accuracy for
tractability: using a heuristic algorithm, unsafe model states may be found (given
such exist), while termination of the algorithm cannot be guaranteed. The idea
of heuristic safety analysis thus leverages the semi-decidability of the problem.
On the plus side, valuable hints on model correctness are obtained if unsafe
states are found and policy engineers are pointed to input sequences that lead
to such states.
The strategy behind heuristic safety analysis algorithms is to find an input
sequence that, starting at q, enters r into a matrix cell of some follow-up state
qtarget. When this happens, q is proven to be unsafe with respect to r; as long
as no such target state is found, the search continues. Therefore, a successful
algorithm must exploit model properties that maximize the probability of an
input to contribute to a path from q to qtarget.
4.2 Dependency Search
We will now outline the DepSearch safety analysis heuristic for HRU mod-
els. We developed it based on the insight that in the most difficult case, right
leakages in a model are well hidden and appear only after long state transi-
tion sequences where each command executed depends exactly on the execution
of its predecessor. Even for such hard analysis cases, DepSearch has turned
out successful [3]. Essentially, DepSearch consists of two phases: static and dy-
namic analysis. We will discuss these phases on an informal basis, for an in-depth
discussion and evaluation of the algorithm see [3, 4].
In the first phase, a static analysis of the HRU state transition scheme
is performed. It yields a structured description of inter-command dependencies,
constituted by entering (as a part of POST) and requiring (part of PRE) the same
right in two different commands. The knowledge about these dependencies is
encoded in a command dependency graph (CDG) whose vertices are commands,
and an edge from command c1 to command c2 denotes that a post-condition of
c1 matches at least one pre-condition of c2.
The CDG is assembled in a way that all paths from vertices without incoming
edges to vertices without outgoing edges indicate input sequences for reaching
qtarget from q. To achieve this, two virtual commands cq and ctarget are generated:
cq is the source of all paths in the CDG, since it represents the state q to analyze
in terms of a command specification added to ∆. It is generated by encoding
acmq in POST(cq). In a similar manner, ctarget is the sink of all paths in the
CDG, which represents all possible states qtarget by checking the presence of the
target right in any matrix cell in PRE(ctarget).
In the second, dynamic analysis phase, the CDG is used to guide dynamic
state transitions by generating input sequences to the automaton. The com-
mands involved in each sequence are chosen according to different paths from cq
and ctarget . Consequently, DepSearch successively generates input sequences
by traversing the CDG on every possible path and in turn parameterizing the
emerging sequence of commands with values that can be inferred from a con-
straint satisfaction problem (CSP) solver. Each effected state transition is sim-
ulated by the algorithm, and once a CDG path is completed, the validity of the
unsafety-criteria (Def. 1) is checked.
5 Generalized Framework
As introduced so far, theDepSearch algorithm is restricted to analyzing models
of the classical HRU calculus. The family of dynamic model properties however
spans the whole range of access control models, which requires an adaption of
DepSearch for each an every such model. In [4], we have hinted at a uniform
generalization of DepSearch, however, the previous work always resorts to
HRU; problems related to tailoring a general core-based model to a specific
notion of safety and interpreting this in terms of DepSearch have not yet been
addressed in detail. In particular, there was no uniform workflow for heuristic-
tailoring that avoids a re-design of each mode-dependent part of the heuristic.
With entity labeling we have introduced a plus of semantic information that
can be used to tailor such a general safety analysis algorithm to a specific model
and analysis goal in a consistent workflow. In this section, we will first present
Algorithm 1: fDepSearch
In: δ . . . model’s state transition function
∆ . . . model’s state transition scheme, specifying δ
q0 . . . model state the safety of which is to be analyzed
target . . . leakage target
Out: STS . . . state transition sequence leaking target
q ← q0;
〈CDG , cq〉 ← CDGAssembly(∆, q, target );
STS ← q;
repeat
path ← CDGPathGeneration(CDG , cq);
(d) params ← assignParams(q, path);
while c← path.nextNode do
q′ ← δ(q, c, params(c));
STS ← STS ◦ q′;
q ← q′;
until(a) isLeaked(q0, q
′, target);
return STS ;
the idea behind the generalization, fallowed by a description of the workflow how
to specialize it. This workflow will then be demonstrated based on the practical
case of an SELinux access control model in Sec. 6.
5.1 Generalizing DepSearch
In this section, we present fDepSearch as a variant of the original HRU algo-
rithm including a number of abstract interfaces. These interfaces originate from
a modular view on the heuristic, which is composed of both model-independent
and mode-dependent modules. Fig. 2 illustrates this. Based on the model-dependent
submodules, we consider three semantic abstractions: safety, dependency, and
model dynamics. These abstractions and their related interfaces will now be dis-
cussed based on the fDepSearch algorithm specifications (Algs. 1 and 2).2
The interfaces isLeaked (Alg. 1 (a)) and createCDGSink (Alg. 2 (b)) represent
the analysis goal of the heuristics, expressed through a formal definition of safety
(such as Def. 1 for HRU) and its target in terms of some model component (such
as a right r). isLeaked is specified as a boolean function that implements a formal
unsafety criteria, which may be satisfied by any model state q′ reached during
heuristic execution. createCDGSink is part of the static model analysis and uses
the knowledge about the safety target to generate a virtual command ctarget in
the CDG as described in Sec. 4.2, which ensures that generated paths during
the dynamic analysis always end in a command leaking the target.
2 We have stripped down the algorithm specification to the relevant parts for this
discussion, leaving aside path generation strategies and graph traversal attributes,
which are exclusively model-independent and thus need not to be tailored.
Algorithm 2: fDepSearch::CDGAssembly
In: ∆ . . . model’s state transition scheme
q . . . model’s state the safety of which is analyzed
target . . . leakage target
Out: 〈V,E〉 . . . command dependency graph
cq . . . starting point for the command sequence generation
procedure predecessors(in v ∈ V )
(c) P ← buildPredSet(∆, v);
for c ∈ P do
if c /∈ V then
V ← V ∪ {c};
predecessors(c);
E ← E ∪ {〈c, v〉};
(e) cq ← createCDGSource(q);
(b) ctarget ← createCDGSink(target);
∆← ∆ ∪ {cq};
V ← {ctarget};
E ← ∅;
predecessors(ctarget);
return 〈V,E〉 , d, dˆ, cq;
fDepSearch
(Model-Specific
Modules)
isLeaked
assignParams
CDGAssembly
createCDGSink
createCDGSource
buildPredSet
(Model-Independent
Modules)
CDGPathGeneration
Fig. 2. Modules in fDepSearch. Generic interfaces are printed italic.
Implementing the safety abstractions also enables an implementation of the
model’s notion of dependency through the interfaces buildPredSet (Alg. 2 (c))
and assignParams (Alg. 1 (d)). The former steers the generation of the CDG
during static model analysis, where a formal definition of dependency (based on
the previously defined safety and target) is used to add predecessor-edges be-
tween a command and other commands that establish necessary conditions for
it to be executed. In an HRU model for example, this means for any given com-
mand cmd in the state transition scheme, a command cmd ′ is a predecessor of
cmd iff entering rights in POST(cmd ′) has an impact on the value of PRE(cmd).
The latter interface, assignParams, is actually another heuristic in itself.
Since the static phase of DepSearch analyzes dependencies based on PRE and
POST formulas only, yet disregarding the actual assignment of parameters that
determine their values, parameter selection becomes a problem on its own. Again,
the goal here is to maximize satisfiability and thus execution of commands on
a CDG path that may eventually leak the safety target. Therefore, an imple-
mentation of assignParams must also take into account dependencies between
commands, which may now established by their parameters relating to common
model components. We have developed an approach to express the parameter
selection problem as a constraint satisfaction problem by introducing a second
graph, the parameter constraint network, that is input to a heuristically modified
version of Poole’s and Mackworth’s arc consistency algorithm [23]. An evaluation
of this parameter selection heuristic is still ongoing work. Formally, assignParams
is an interface that evaluates both a base state q for path execution and the def-
inition of commands in the path, to return a mapping of these commands to
assignments for their individual parameters.
As a last abstract interface, createCDGSource (Alg. 2 (e)) generates the vir-
tual command cq in the CDG. Its implementation is independent from the other
abstractions, since it only takes into account knowledge of model dynamics
to construct POST(cq) based on the model state the safety of which is to be
analyzed.
5.2 Tailoring fDepSearch
In practice, manual implementation of these interfaces from scratch is still an
error-prone process. To support this step and thus streamline the model-independent
use of fDepSearch, EL categories are used to guide a three-phases workflow:
First, the actual core-based model is created and amended by EL semantics.
Second, a meaningful formal safety definition is derived from the model. Third,
the abstract interfaces are actually implemented based on the safety definition
and additional information from EL semantics. We will now detail these phases
and guidelines they leverage for a well-structured, error-reducing manual or even
partially automated process of dynamic model analysis.
1. Model Specification Goal of the first phase is to model an access control
policy in a formal calculus suitable for dynamic analysis.
(Step 1.1) As soon as an AC policy’s semantics are designed, EL categories
should be used to identify and classify formal structures such as sets, relations,
and mapping according to Sec. 3.2. Result is an EL model 〈CAT , sem〉.
(Step 1.2) In [22, pp. 25–27], the basic steps of specializing a core-based
model for an access control policy are outlined (we summarized them in Sec. 3.1).
In order to enable the modeling of dynamic behavior, these steps should now
be applied to our EL model. We therefore classify model components into DYN
and STAT and derive a state transition scheme ∆ from policy rules.3 Result is
a second, core-based model M = 〈Q,Σ, δ, λ, q0,Ext〉 covering the same policy.
2. Safety Specification In the second phase, the analysis goal has to be for-
malized in terms of a safety-property.
(Step 2.1) The access control function describes the impact of model compo-
nents on the dynamic behavior of λ. Therefore, it formally defines the necessary
conditions for any kind of safety-violating state transition (i. e. leakage). In prac-
tice, the ACF of a system may by obtained from two different sources: On the
one hand, requirements engineering on a rigorously low level of abstraction may
have already stipulated access restrictions in a formal way. On the other hand,
especially in case of rich and complex policies that steer diverse security mech-
anisms,4 a condensed and precise ACF may not be achievable right from the
beginning of system engineering. In this latter case however, EL model seman-
tics can be used to bridge the gap between informal requirements and a formal
ACF definition as follows.
Formally, an ACF is a function acf : Σ → B with acf (σ) ⇔ φacf . Since the
occurrence of model components from AR in PRE(c) is a necessary condition for
a command c to make an authorization decision (cf. EL semantics), a disjunction
over such conditions determines the ACF as follows:
φacf ::= [[
∨
φi∈ΦAR
φi ]] where
ΦAR ::= {PRE(c), c ∈ ΣC | ∃x ∈ M|AR :
PRE(c) depends on the value of x} .
(1)
(Step 2.2) Based on the ACF, we will now extract such clauses involving
model components in the set DYN from the core-based pattern: this yields a
set of dynamically changing leakage conditions. Each possible effect of a state
transition influencing one of these clauses can be considered a leak, which leads to
a maximal number of safety definitions based on these leaks. These definitions
together with the target model components can be inferred automatically, as
demonstrated in Sec. 6.2.
(Step 2.3) For a complex model featuring multiple components responsible
for authorization, it becomes obvious that a number of alternate safety defini-
tions is formally possible. Which one of them however is meaningful in practice
3 A detailed example an how the latter can be obtained in practice is given in [2].
4 In today’s operating systems for example, a hybrid of attribute-based access control
and information flow policies is common.
must be decided in the next step and requires human knowledge, possibly once
again by comparison against security requirements. Model components from the
EL category RR are responsible for authorization changes in a protection state
and therefore give a first indicator for filtering irrelevant safety definitions. More
details on a practical case will be presented in Sec. 6.2.
3. Heuristic Specification In the last phase, the abstract interfaces of fDepSearch
can be implemented based on the formal model and the definitions of safety and
analysis target. As outlined in Sec. 5.1, the safety and target definitions guide the
implementations of isLeaked and creadeCDGSink directly and, indirectly via the
indirection of dependency abstraction drawn from the safety property, also the
implementation of buildPredSet and assignParams. The most straight-forward
implementation is that of createCDGSource, based on the model dynamics de-
clared through DYN . Again, Sec. 6.2 will illustrate this process by implementing
some of these interfaces.
6 Application to SELinux
The goal of this section is to demonstrate the tailoring of fDepSearch based
on a real-world case study. To this end, we specify a safety analysis algorithm
for the widespread policy-controlled operating system SELinux. For the sake
of clarity, we will restrict our study to the analysis goal of safety analysis and
cover the EL modeling of our policy only to that extend; more specifically, we
will omit the model constraints (MC ) components which are intended to support
the verification of static model consistency properties. As used in SELinux, these
model components could be used for proving interative policy properties similar
to BLP security [7].
In the following sections, we will successively address the three major phases
in tailoring our analysis framework: model specification, safety specification, and
heuristic specification as described in Sec. 5.2.
6.1 SELinux Model
To set the stage for safety analysis, we will briefly revisit the core-based/EL
model for the SELinux access control system (SELX) from [2]. The model com-
ponents that formally represent the SELinux access control semantics are
– C: the set of object classes
– U : the set of SELinux users
– R: the set of roles
– T : the set of types
– E: the set of all system resources, including processes
– →֒r ⊆ R2: a relation modeling allowed role transitions
– −֒→t ⊆ T 3: a relation modeling entrypoints and allowed type transitions
– P : the set of permissions
Table 1. Classification of SELX model components in EL and core-based modeling
patterns.
SELX Q Members Ext Members
LS — C,U,R, T
RR — →֒r, −֒→t
ES E —
LA cl , con —
AR — allow , P
– allow : T × T × C → 2P : a mapping of keys for TE-allow-rules to their
associated permissions
– cl : E → C: a mapping of resources to their object classes
– con : E → U ×R× T : a mapping of resources to their security contexts
These model components are classified according to both patterns as shown in
Tab. 1.
6.2 SELinux Safety
In [2], it was argued that a two-step approach to specifying dynamic model be-
havior (δ and λ of a core-based model) reduces analysis complexity and stream-
lines a generic approach to dynamic analyses. We will now substantiate this
claim by using basic commands for deriving a safety definition that allows to
tailor fDepSearch to this model. The definitions of SELX basic commands
to create and remove system resources, relabel processes and authorize access
requests are given in Fig. 3.
(Step 2.1) To determine the SELX ACF, only conditions checking AR model
components need to be taken into account. For example, PRE(remove) = [[ e ∈
Eq ]] in Fig. 3 checks for the presence of a given entity e, which is independent of
AR model components and therefore constitutes a mere consistency-check rather
than an authorization decision. In case of our SELX basic commands, only access
is influenced by AR components (which hints at the significance of a multi-level
commands specification). Since acf solely depends on PRE(access), φacf from
Equation 1 expands to
acf (e, e′, p) ⇔ ∃ t, t′, c′ :
(2.1) {e, e′} ⊆ Eq
(2.2) ∧ clq(e) = process
(2.3) ∧ clq(e′) = c′
(2.4) ∧ conq(e) = 〈 , , t〉
(2.5) ∧ conq(e′) = 〈 , , t′〉
(2.6) ∧ p ∈ allow (t, t′, c′)
(2)
(Step 2.2) In the next step, we identify those clauses in φacf that relate
to common dynamic model components in the core-based sense. In SELX, three
such cases can be found:
◮ create(e, e′, c′) ::=
PRE: e ∈ Eq
∧ e′ ∈ E \Eq
∧ c′ ∈ C
∧ conq(e) = 〈u, r, t〉 ;
POST: Eq′ = Eq ∪ {e
′}
∧ clq′ = clq [e
′ 7→ c′]
∧ conq′ = conq [e
′ 7→ 〈u, r, t〉]
◮ remove(e) ::=
PRE: e ∈ Eq ;
POST: Eq′ = Eq \ {e}
∧ clq′ = clq ↾Eq′
∧ conq′ = conq ↾Eq′
◮ relabel(e, f, r′, t′) ::=
PRE: e ∈ Eq
∧ clq(e) = process
∧ conq(e) = 〈u, r, t〉
∧ conq(f) = 〈 , , tf 〉
∧ r →֒r r
′
∧ t
tf
−֒→t t
′ ;
POST: conq′ = conq[e 7→ 〈u, r
′, t′〉]
◮ access(e, e′, p) ::=
PRE: {e, e′} ⊆ Eq
∧ clq(e) = process
∧ clq(e
′) = c′
∧ conq(e) = 〈 , , t〉
∧ conq(e
′) = 〈 , , t′〉
∧ p ∈ allow(t, t′, c′) ;
POST: ⊤
Fig. 3. SELX basic commands of a low-level SELinux state transition scheme. For
better readability we have replaced solely syntactical declarations of variables by the
wildcard symbol “ ” (which should otherwise be a generic, ∃-quantified placeholder).
1. Clause (2.1) checks for the presence of entities.
2. Clauses (2.2)–(2.3) check for a specific class assigned to an entity.
3. Clauses (2.4)–(2.5) check for a specific type assigned to an entity. The wild-
cards tell us that both user- and role-attributes of the security context are
irrelevant for this comparison.
We can ignore clause (2.6), since no dynamic state change may influence the
allow -mapping.
Case 1 trivially implies that any new entity contributes to satisfying the
ACF, which means that entity leaks (effected by changing E) can be considered
a first kind of unsafety. Similarly, case 2 hints at class assignment leaks (via cl)
and case 3 at type assignment leaks (via con). We therefore identify three safety
definitions for SELX, based on these leakage targets e, c, and t as follows:
Definition 2. Given a SELX model 〈Q,Σ, δ, λ, q0,Ext〉, a state q ∈ Q is (e)-
unsafe with respect to an entity e ∈ E iff ∃ q′ ∈ {δ∗(q, a) | a ∈ Σ∗}:
e ∈ Eq′ ∧ e /∈ Eq .
Definition 3. Given a SELX model 〈Q,Σ, δ, λ, q0,Ext〉, a state q ∈ Q is (c)-
unsafe with respect to an object class c ∈ C iff ∃ q′ ∈ {δ∗(q, a) | a ∈ Σ∗}:
∃e ∈ Eq′ ∩ Eq : clq′(e) = c ∧ clq(e) 6= c .
Definition 4. Given a SELX model 〈Q,Σ, δ, λ, q0,Ext〉, a state q ∈ Q is (t)-
unsafe with respect to a type t ∈ T iff ∃ q′ ∈ {δ∗(q, a) | a ∈ Σ∗}:
∃e ∈ Eq′ ∩ Eq : conq′(e) = 〈 , , t〉 ∧ conq(e) = 〈 , , tq〉 ∧ t 6= tq .
(Step 2.3) Two conclusions can be drawn from the three definitions above:
first, irrelevant safety definitions can be filtered to some extent by leveraging the
information provided by core- and EL-semantics. In case of Def. 3, it becomes
clear by studying POST expressions in the state transition scheme (Fig. 3) that
entity classification is only performed during entity creation. Alternatively, the
same fact can be inferred from the absence of any reference to the label set C
within SELX|RR.
Second, these safety definitions are deliberately demarcated with respect to
their targets, which means they can be combined in a straight-forward way. As
an example, an alternate definition of (t)-safety could also cover any new entity
not present in q. This results in a definition of (t)-simple-safety aligned with
Def. 1:
Definition 5. Given a SELX model 〈Q,Σ, δ, λ, q0,Ext〉, a state q ∈ Q is (t)-
simple-unsafe with respect to a type t ∈ T iff ∃ q′ ∈ {δ∗(q, a) | a ∈ Σ∗}:
q is (t)-unsafe with respect to t
∨
(
∃e ∈ Eq′ : conq′(e) = 〈 , , t〉 ∧ q is (e)-unsafe with respect to e
)
.
Fixing independent variables such as e in Def. 4 opens up even more variants
of safety, similar to the specializations of (r)-simple-safety presented in [33]. For
example, a specialized definition of (e,t)-safety could target a combination of
both an entity leak and a type assignment leak. This task of refining safety
definitions is, as above, subject to human interaction that provides additional
semantic information about relevant analysis goals.
6.3 fDepSearch for SELX
We now tailor fDepSearch to (t)-safety as an example. The safety definition is
the foundation for determining heuristics behavior, which is defined through the
model-specific modules introduced in Sec. 5.1. The tailoring of these modules is
implemented in the algorithms 3–6, given in Appendix A. For the scope of this
paper, we have opted for omitting a detailed discussion of assignParams, which
is still subject to ongoing work.
Firstly, the function SELX::tUnsafe::isLeaked (Alg. 3) is a direct implementa-
tion of the unsafety property given in Def. 4. The actual dependency analysis is
performed by SELX::tUnsafe::buildPredSet (Alg. 4). Based on some CDG vertex
c = 〈succ, xsucc,PRE(succ),POST(succ)〉, the algorithm builds a set
{cpred = 〈pred , xpred ,PRE(pred),POST(pred)〉 ∈ ∆ | ∃t ∈ T :
PRE(succ) and POST(pred) depend on the value of t}
of commands whose prior execution c depends on. In the actual implementation,
label assignment model components (SELX|LA) in pre- and post-conditions are
checked to identify dependencies. An auxiliary set TDep is then used to store
and compare types these dependencies relate to.
createCDGSource, implemented as SELX::createCDGSource (Alg. 5), can be
inferred easily if multi-level command specification is used to define a distin-
guished create command: in that case, POST(cmd) in Alg. 5 matches POST(create)
in the state transition scheme.
At last, the implementation of createCDGSink as SELX::tUnsafe::createCDGSink
(Alg. 6) must be a direct consequence from the implementation of isLeaked.
7 Conclusions
This paper aimed at a uniform formal framework, tailorable for dynamic analysis
of a wide range of access control models. The high-level goal behind this work
is to demonstrate the practical benefits of combining semantically enhanced
modeling patterns, such as EL and core-based modeling, when it comes to model
analysis in a holistic security engineering process.
To achieve this, we have adapted the DepSearch heuristic safety analy-
sis algorithm to an access control model for the SELinux operating system.
Model-independent interfaces have been introduced into the heuristic, which are
then tailored to the SELinux model in a workflow that is guided by semantic
knowledge drawn from the modeling patterns. Based on such guiding rules, this
workflow is to a significant degree automatable. Because the main portion of
human intelligence is required in the early systems design phase of requirements
engineering, we argue that this approach reduces later design and verification
errors introduced through manually deriving formal methods for these steps.
Subject to future work is a thoroughly formalized, rule-based framework
for heuristic tailoring, which enables a prototypical implementation of a model
engineering toolkit to automate the process as far as possible. We have also
started to evaluate the fDepSearch heuristic for SELX in terms of efficiency
and success, which is subject to further improvements that aim at analyzing
real-world systems in a productive setting.

A Appendix
Algorithm 3: SELX::tUnsafe::isLeaked
In: q = 〈E, cl , con〉 . . . model state the safety of which is to be analyzed
q′ =
〈
E′, cl ′, con ′
〉
. . . model state to check for a leak
ttarget . . . leakage target type
Out: ⊤ iff q is (t)-simple-unsafe w. r. t. ttarget
for e ∈ E′ ∩ E do
〈 , , t〉 ← con(e);
〈 , , t′〉 ← con ′(e);
if t′ = ttarget ∧ t 6= ttarget then return ⊤;
return ⊥;
Algorithm 4: SELX::tUnsafe::buildPredSet
In: ∆ . . . model’s state transition scheme
c = 〈succ, xsucc,PRE(succ),POST(succ)〉 . . . command whose
predecessors are to be found
Out: P ⊆ ∆ . . . set of predecessor commands to c
P ← ∅;
TDep ← ∅;
for φ ∈ {φ1 . . . φn |PRE(succ) = [[φ1 ∧ · · · ∧ φn ]]} do
if φ = [[ conq( ) = 〈 , , t〉 ]] then TDep ← TDep ∪ {t};
for cpred = 〈pred , xpred ,PRE(pred),POST(pred)〉 ∈ ∆ do
for ψ ∈ {ψ1 . . . ψn |POST(pred) = [[ψ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ψn ]]} do
if ψ = [[ conq′ = conq[ 7→ 〈 , , t〉] ]] ∧ t ∈ TDep then
P ← P ∪ {cpred};
return P ;
Algorithm 5: SELX::createCDGSource
In: q = 〈E, cl , con〉 . . . model state the safety of which is to be analyzed
Out: cmd . . . identifier for the virtual CDG source command
xcmd . . . sequence of formal parameters for cmd
PRE(cmd) . . . pre-condition of cmd
POST(cmd) . . . post-condition of cmd
cmd ← “virtualSourceCmd”;
xcmd ← ǫ;
PRE(cmd)← [[⊤ ]];
POST(cmd)← [[⊤ ]];
for e ∈ E do
ψe ← [[Eq′ = Eq ∪ {e}
∧ clq′ = clq[e 7→ cl(e)]
∧ conq′ = conq[e 7→ con(e)] ]];
POST(cmd)← [[POST(cmd) ∧ ψe ]];
return cmd , xcmd ,PREcmd ,POSTcmd ;
Algorithm 6: SELX::tUnsafe::createCDGSink
In: ttarget . . . leakage target type
Out: cmd . . . identifier for the virtual CDG sink command
xcmd ∈ ΣX . . . sequence of formal parameters for cmd
PRE(cmd) . . . pre-condition of cmd
POST(cmd) . . . post-condition of cmd
cmd ← “virtualSinkCmd”;
xcmd ← ǫ;
PRE(cmd)← [[∃e ∈ Eq : conq(e) =
〈
, , ttarget
〉
]];
POST(cmd)← [[⊤ ]];
return cmd , xcmd ,PREcmd ,POSTcmd ;
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